User blog:SydneyFFG03/Battle of Cape Matapan - HMAS Stuart

Admiral Raeder, German Naval Commander-in-Chief and his opposite number, Admiral Riccardi, met in Italy during the middle of Fuburary 1941 to discuss a possible attack British convoys to Greece by the Italian fleet. Although no decision was reached, the Germans repeaed their demand on 5th March after British troops begun building up in Greece. The Italians were still unwilling to cooperate as the Italian fleet was quite unprepared for an attack on Cunninghams strong forces, which included three battleships and an amoured aircraft carrier.

The Germans were determined to stop the convoys and applied pressure to the Italians promising an attack on the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet by German Torpedo Bombers on 16th March. On that day, the Germans claimed two of three battleships in Cunninghams fleet out of action. This was not true and the Italians knew it as they had flown three reconnaissances to confirm the damage.But finally they agreed to attack the convoys with the promise of aid from the Luftwaffe. Admiral Iachino, CnC Italian Fleet, was well aware that the probable outcome would be a fleet action but he was relying strongly on the Luftwaffe to inflict heavy damage to Cunninghams fleet and provide reconnaissance.

On 26th March the battle fleet VALIANT, WARSPITE, BARHAM and the new armoured carrier FORMIDABLE lay in Alexandria. With the battle fleet was the 14th Flotilla, JERVIS, NUBIAN and MOHAWK under Capt. Mack in JERVIS and the 10th Flotilla, STUART, HOTSPUR, GREYHOUND and GRIFFIN under Capt. Waller.

On the same day Vice Admiral Pridham-Wipple in ORION was in the Aegean in command of the cruisers ORION, PERTH and AJAX of the 7th, and GLOUCESTER of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron. With the cruisers were the 2nd Flotilla ILEX, HASTY, HEREWARD and VENDETTA.

Also on the 26th, VAMPIRE and VOYAGER were escorting convoy AG9 to Piraeus. Cunningham now had intelligence of possible movements of the Italian fleet and ordered AG9 maintain its course northward until dark then reverse course back to Alexandria. A south bound convoy was due to leave Piraeus on the 27th, and as action was imminient, Cunnimgham ordered them to remain in harbour.

The RAF was asked to make recconaissances of the Aegean Sea to the west of Crete and the Fleet Air Arm stood by with fighters and torpedo bombers.

The Italians units sailed from their bases and steamed eastwards at high speed onthe morning of the 27th March. The Fleet steamed on all day, but there was no signs of the promised aircover from the Luftwaffe appeared in the sky.

The Luftwaffe was missing but the RAF was not. A Sunderland flying boat from Malta sighted three heavy cruisers at 1230 about 80miles south east of Sicily. Admiral Iachino now realised that there was no question of surprise. On receiving RAF reports, Admiral Cunningham decied to put to sea with his battle fleet, but delayed his depature until dark for security reasons. Cunningham added to his personal deception by going ashore in the early afternoon with golf clubs and a suit case to give the impression that he would be away from his flagship overnight.At dusk the fleet put to sea to rendezvous with Pridham-Wipple at 1700 on the 28th south west of Crete.

At dawn FORMIDABLE turned into the wind to fly off her Swordfish torpedo bombers to locate the enemy. Just before 0800 the aircraft reported sighting four cruisers and six destroyers 30miles south of Gavdoes Isle, steering SSE. Both Cunningham and Pridem-Wippel considered at first that this was Pridham-Wipple's cruisers and destroyers. But the force was sighted by ORION shortly afterwards and it was evident that the enemy was in sight and it was not 'just another sweep'. Cunningham turned and increased speed.

The enemy ships were identified as 8" ships superior in range, speed and gun power. Pridham-Wipple tried to lead them towards the approaching battle fleet. The Italians opened fire at 0812 at a range of 13 miles but the salvos fell short. At 0855 the Italians ceased fire and turned northwards.

Half an hour later, not being able to keep the required speed, VENDETTA was ordered to join the Battle Fleet, which was sighted at noon. Only an hour after joining engine trouble developed and she was ordered to return to Aelxandria.

Reports continued to flow indicating that there was a second enemy force, possibly with battleships to the north of the cruisers. About 1100 Pridham-Wipple reported two battleships 16miles to the north and turned south east under the cover of smoke. His forces were now in a most uncomfortable position with enemy cruisers on the starboard quarter and battleships to port. FORMIDABLE was therefore ordered to strike immediately at the battleships while Cunningham moved to support the cruisers. By noon, the enemy battleship - there now appeared to only be one - was estimated to be 45miles from Cuninghams fleet. The battleship was identified as LITTORIO class and was in fact Italys newest battleship the VITTORIO VENETO, with the same armament of WARSPITE, but considerably faster.

10minutes laster Pridham-Wipple lost contact with the battleships, but FORMIDABLE's striking force soon returned and mistakingly reported one torpedo hit on the battleship. Vice Admiral Pridham-Wipple made contact with CnC at 1240. All his ships were unscathed by the long range 15" fire of VITTORIO VENETO.  Cunningham now turned west in pursuit of the VITTORIO VENETO and ordered FORMIDABLE to fly off another striking force. The prospects of catching the battleship were not good unless her speed could be reduced.

Five Swordfish torpedo-bombers attacked between 1510 and 1525 and claimed three hits on VITTORIO VENETO, reducing her speed to 8 knots. However, by 1900, her speed was back up to 19 knots, the hits on her port quarter.

FORMIDABLE's aircraft attacked again at 1925, byt met a tremendous barrage and were forced to withdraw and split up. The last attack was made by a Swordfish at 1945 flying just above the water. The pilot pressed in to close range through a withering fire and succeded in torpedoing the heavy cruiser POLA between the engine and the boiler room. The cruiser stopped, badly damaged. As Admiral Iachino and his fleet steamed westard, he was unaware that POLA had been hit and stopped.

It soon became clear that the VITTORIO VENETO was mking faster progress to the west than was justified by the air reports, and that soon she would not be caught before dark. The situation remained obscure. Cunningham therefore decided to catapult WARSPITE's Walrus with his own experienced observer onboard. On recieving his observers report at 1915, Cunningham had a clearer picture of the situation. The Italian forces were proceeding WNW in five columns at 15 knots about 45 miles from WASPITE. VITTORIO VENETO was in the centre with four destroyers screening ahead and two astern. In the port inner column was three heavy cruisers of the TRENTO class and the inner starboard column three heavy cruisers of the ZARA class. There was three destroyers on the port and two on the starboard outer column.

Cunningham had decided whether to lead the fleet into a night action against such a force. The alternative was to let the enemy escape. Cunningham had decided to accept a night action and at 2040 ordered the 2nd and 14th Flotillas to attack. A screen of only four destroyers was retained -- STUART and HAVOC to starboard, GREYHOUND and GRIFFITH to port. "As the executive singal was made" wrote HOTSPUR's 1st Lieutenant, "The great arc of the destroyer screen faded and became shapeless as each destroyer foamed up to 30 knots, twisting and turning like snipe, they fell into single lines astern of their leaders."

Cunnnghams signal was recieved with considerably less enthusiasm by STUART. Singnalman L.E. Clifford recalled that Captain Waller murmured: "It looks like we're going to miss out on the fun." He was soon proved to be wrong as that night STUART had the wildest night of her life.

The ships steamed westwards through a clear dark night with a calm sea. On STUARTS bridge they could hear the forward gun crews singing softly.

Meanwhile, Pridham-Wipple ws trying to regain visual contact with the Italian fleet which had been lost subsequent to the last air attack and stopping of the POLA. Courage and skill of the Swordfish pilot concerned lvery largely determined the course of the night action. The Italian Admiral believed the British fleet was 90 miles astern of him instead of half that distance and at 2130 he dispatched the cruisers ZARA and FIUME with four destroyers to find the damaged POLA.

Pridham-Wipple and his cruisers had a difficult problem to regain contact with the VITTORIO VENETO escorted by 6 cruisers and elevan destroyers. Cunningham received a report from him at 2111 that an unknown ship lying stopped had been located by radar and altered course to close. Hopes ran high that it was the Italian battleship. The flagship had no radar, but an hour lataer VALIANT reported that she had picked up the same ship on her radar only 6 miles from her port bow. The battle fleet were already at action stations with the main armaments ready and trained on the correct bearing. The radar contact was the POLA.

Cunningham handled the battle squadron as though it were a destroyer division and stationed his escorting destroyers on the starboard beam. Radar reports were coming in all the time and in tense readiness the battleships stramed towards the enemy. It was STUART who first sighted the enemy.

"At 2225 STUART sighted ships about 4miles at bearing 250 degrees and made an enemy report to the Commander-in-Chief." recorded STUART's chronicle. "Course was altered together and the enemy was made to be about five cruisers/destroyer, passing down the battle fleets port side. At 2230 the battle fleet opened fire."